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Memorialization is a tool of transitional justice that utilizes the power of 
memory to recognize a society’s painful history to cultivate a new understanding of past 
and present injustices. In post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, the establishment of 
memorialization efforts are highly contested, as they are implemented by local 
communities, political elites, and the international community in an ethno-nationalist 
society with a unique memoryscape that widely functions on ethnic division rather than 
unification. This thesis utilizes the case studies of the Slana Banja memorial complex in 
Tuzla and the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery in Potočari to analyze and 
contrast the forms, functions, successes, and limitations of memorialization efforts in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Through my research, I am to highlight the power of memory 
as a tool to alter societies, demonstrating that history is never confined to the past and it 
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Purpose of Study 
There are few places that I have traveled to that illicit such a wonderous 
emotional response comparable to that I felt while visiting Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
the summer of 2019. The topography itself is breathtaking, full of beautiful 
mountainous terrain and lush valleys. However, I was particularly struck by the rich 
history of the country and the fluidity and resilience of identity throughout its many 
trials and tribulations. I remember standing in front of the plaque in Sarajevo 
designating the spot where Archduke Franz Ferdinand was shot in 1914, while down the 
block, there stood a building severely damaged from artillery used during the 1992-
1996 siege of Sarajevo in the Bosnian war. In that moment, I began to understand the 
significance of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a historical centerpiece of Europe and the 
Western Balkans and develop an interest in the politics of memory. 
I traveled to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) with fellow students from the 
University of Oregon on a study abroad trip titled “Human Rights and Peace Studies in 
the Balkans,” led by University of Oregon faculty Will Johnson and Balkan human 
rights activist Emina Bužinkić.1 During the program, we met with various activists and 
non-governmental organizations in Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, and BiH to discuss 
international and domestic transitional justice and peacebuilding mechanisms 
implemented during the aftermath of the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the 
subsequent wars in the Western Balkans. I had not previously learned about the Bosnian 
                                                 
1 Throughout my paper, I will use the abbreviation BiH when referring to Bosnia and Herzegovina. BiH 





war, and I was overwhelmed trying to grapple with the atrocities that occurred in the 
region while similarly feeling inspired by the work of incredible individuals and 
organizations working to promote human rights and reconciliation.  
During my time in the Western Balkans, I was fascinated to learn about 
transitional justice mechanisms implemented in BiH, precisely memorialization as a 
tool to address the past. Similar to the various ways people can discuss the past, there is 
no singular blueprint for memorialization efforts. Essentially, memorialization takes 
many forms, and each step is dependent on the needs and priorities of each community 
and may acknowledge an individual, group, or event to document past events.2 
Although varied in form and function, the process of using public spaces to encourage a 
dialogue about the past has emerged in all regions of the world.3 Because they are 
unique to the community they serve, not everyone will accept every memorialization 
effort, nor do all memorials function to promote reconciliation. However, researching 
the implementation and effects of memorialization efforts helps form an understanding 
of how societies try to recover in the aftermath of conflict and trauma and explore how 
documenting the past can be a unifying or divisive process. 
I chose to focus my thesis on post-war memorialization efforts in BiH because 
the country was at the epicenter of ethnic conflict during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. 
When the Bosnian war began in 1992, the country’s ethnic breakdown was the most 
diverse of the countries in the former Yugoslavia. The 1990 census in BiH 
demonstrated that before the war, 17% of Bosnian citizens identified as Croats, 31% 
                                                 
2 Kelli Muddell and Sibley Hawkins, “Gender and Transitional Justice: A Training Module Series,” 
October 2018, 13. 





identified as Serbs, and 44% identified as Bosniaks, with 5.5% of the population 
identifying as Yugoslav and 2.5% identifying as either Roma, Jewish, or Sinti.4 Each of 
the primary ethnic groups has different religious practices, as the majority of Croats are 
Roman Catholic, Serbs identify as Eastern Orthodox, and Bosniaks practice Islam. 
Before the Bosnian war, nearly 27% of all marriages in BiH were ethnically diverse.5 
However, the beginning of the war challenged BiH’s diversity and interethnic relations, 
and ethnic tensions between Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks in BiH 
escalated into extreme violence and genocide.6 Today in BiH, there are vastly different 
politicized conceptions of history, which frame the future of the country. Ethno-
nationalist tensions remain at the forefront of BiH’s political and social landscape and 
manifests into the establishment of memorialization efforts in the region.  
Research Questions 
Before I visited the Western Balkans, I had seen many memorial sites. Still, I 
had never profoundly questioned the process of their construction or purpose as a tool 
for societies to address the past. However, after visiting memorial sites throughout the 
Western Balkans, I knew that I wanted to explore further the implementation and effects 
of memorialization in post-war BiH. My thesis aims to answer the following questions:  
                                                 
4 “Bosnia and Herzegovina - History Background,” StateUniversity.com, accessed April 29, 2021, 
https://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/174/Bosnia-Herzegovina-history-background.html 
5 “Bosnia and Herzegovina - History Background.” 
6 Bosniaks and Muslim Bosnians are used interchangeably in literature discussing this subject. Prior to 
1993, the world Muslim was used to describe any Slavic-speaking Muslim living in Bosnia. In 1993, the 
Bosnian Assembly declared Bosniak as the official term for Muslim Bosnians. For more information, see 
Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms, and Ger Duijzings, “The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and 
Moral Claims in a Post-War Society,” in The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral 







1. What forms of memorialization exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
2. How do different forms of memorialization pursue or elicit different 
objectives? 
3. What factors limit memorialization processes in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina? 
4. How are memorialization efforts evaluated as successful or 
unsuccessful? 
This thesis begins with an overview of the 1992-1995 Bosnian war to 
contextualize memorialization efforts within the post-war landscape of BiH. Next, I 
provide a literature review of the forms and functions of transitional justice and 
memorialization before exploring why transitional mechanisms are necessary to 
implement in BiH. Within this section, I specifically examine data on memorialization 
efforts in BiH and discuss the political limitations to their establishment.  
Following my literature review, I contrast the case studies of the Slana Banja 
memorial complex in Tuzla to the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery in 
Potočari. I note how civilians, political officials, and the international community all 
play a role in establishing memorials throughout different political landscapes in BiH.  
Additionally, I use these case studies to analyze and contrast the construction, 
objectives, successes, and limitations of memorialization efforts in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. To determine if a memorialization effort is considered successful or 
unsuccessful, I will contrast the goals of memorialization outlined in my literature 
review with the reflections of people who either constructed the memorial or are 
represented or impacted by the memorial. For the purpose of my analysis as an outsider 
to the region, I will put more weight on the perceptions of people living in BiH to 





completes the outlined goals of transitional justice and memorialization present in my 
literature review. Lastly, my thesis will conclude with a final analysis of what I was 
able to accomplish through my research and suggestions for further study. 
Challenges and Limitations to My Research 
The primary challenge and subsequent limitation to my research is that I do not 
read or speak Bosnian; thus, my sources were limited to those that were translated into 
English or initially written in English. For example, in the case study of the Slana Banja 
memorial complex, I primarily relied on the work of Dr. Ioannis Armakolas, who 
researched the Slana Banja memorial complex through an EU-funded project titled 
‘Cultural Heritage and the Re-construction of Identities after Conflict’ (CRIC).7 His 
research was one of the only sources I found in English that discusses the history of the 
Slana Banja memorial complex and its evolution as a memorialization site; other 
sources I found on the topic always cited his work. Therefore, I wrote my thesis using 
sources from researchers, political scientists, sociologists, activists, and legal scholars 
reporting on research that they conducted themselves in BiH or culminated from 
primary sources written in Bosnian. However, I prioritized using sources written by 
Bosnian scholars and journalists working in the Western Balkans to gather holistic data 
to form my thesis, albeit not representative of all the research on my topic. 
 Additionally, I only analyzed two case studies in my thesis; therefore, the 
conclusions I have drawn about the successes and limitations of memorialization efforts 
from these case studies are not representative of the region as a whole. Choosing only 
                                                 
7 “CRIC's Research on Bosnia,” ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation for European and Former Policy, April 





two case studies inherently limits the scope of my conclusions and analysis. Still, I 
wanted to ensure that I presented the case studies with sufficient detail to adequately 
analyze the implementation and effects of these memorialization efforts.  
 Another limitation to my research is that I am not native to the region. As an 
American, any conclusions I have drawn from my research are not representative of the 
perspectives of Bosnian citizens. I must acknowledge my privilege in researching and 
analyzing these transitional justice and memorialization initiatives in the region as 
someone who has not experienced the atrocities of the Bosnian war and has not lived 
through the effects of regional trauma.  As an outsider, there are inherent limitations to 
the extent that I can perceive and analyze these topics. Regardless, I believe that cross-
cultural learning and understanding are essential to creating a more compassionate 






A Brief Overview of the Bosnian War 
The catalyst for the Bosnian war was the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, but 
the conflict over the territory of BiH has deeper roots. Throughout history, Serbs and 
Croats have continually contested the land of BiH, with tension especially building 
between the two ethnic groups throughout the 20th century.8 In 1939, the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia partitioned BiH in response to a growing rivalry between Serbs and Croats, 
where both groups set their territorial ambitions on acquiring the land of BiH.9 At the 
start of WWII, the Independent State of Croatia annexed BiH with direction from the 
Croat fascist group known as the ustaše, who based their ideology on the beliefs of the 
Nazis.10 After WWII, BiH was reestablished by the new socialist Yugoslavia in 1945 as 
a republic within its boundaries, temporarily dousing the rivalry between Serbs and 
Croats for the territory.11 Yet, after the death of Yugoslavia’s socialist President Josip 
Tito in 1980, whose vision of a multi-ethnic Yugoslavia functioned to suppress 
nationalism, rising nationalism plagued the region and destabilized inter-state 
cooperation within Yugoslavia.12  
In 1990, three ethnically divided parties won the first free elections in 
Yugoslavia: the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party 
(SDS), and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ).13 This rising nationalism from various 
                                                 
8 Xavier Bougarel, Elissa Helms, and Ger Duijzings, “Introduction” in The New Bosnian Mosaic: 
Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 2-35, 4. 
9 Bougarel et. al, “Introduction,” 4. 
In my thesis, I use the terms Serb and Croat to signify the citizens of Serbia and Croatia. When I use 
Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat, I refer to people of Serb or Croat ethnicity that currently reside in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  








ethnic groups in the region contributed to different states seeking independence from 
Yugoslavia.14 In 1991, Slovenia declared independence after a brief 10-day war, and 
Macedonia followed suit. 15 When Croatia declared independence shortly after, the 
Serb-backed Yugoslav People’s Army and other Serb-paramilitary groups seized nearly 
one-third of Croatia’s territory.16 In response, both Croatian President Franjo Tudman 
and Serbian President Slobodan Milošević once again turned to the land of BiH as a 
territorial goal to assert dominance over the region.17  
By late 1991, the SDS and the HDZ declared multiple autonomous regions in 
BiH where Serb and Croat populations were most concentrated.18 In 1992, the SDS 
created the self-proclaimed Serb Republic within BiH, called the Republika Srpska 
(RS). 
                                                 
14 John R. Lampe, “Bosnian War: European History (1992-1995),” Encyclopædia Britannica 
(Encyclopædia Britannica, inc.), accessed March 30, 2021, https://www.britannica.com/event/Bosnian-
War. 
15 Lampe, “Bosnian War: European History (1992-1995)”. 
16 Bougarel et. al, 4.  
17 Bougarel et. al, 4. 






Figure 1: The territorial bounds of Yugoslavia: 1946 vs.1992.  
Source: Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc.19 
In 1992, the European Community (which later became the European Union) proposed 
breaking up BiH into different cantons divided by ethnic majorities, but Bosnian Serbs, 
Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks did not accept the proposed divisions.20 When the United 
States and European Community recognized BiH’s independence in April of 1992,  
Serb-paramilitaries and branches of the Yugoslav People’s Army invaded the capital 
city of Sarajevo. 21 The city was under siege by Bosnian Serb paramilitaries and the 
Yugoslav Army for nearly four years from April of 1992 to February of 1996. 22 Soon, 
BiH became the epicenter of ethnic genocide in the region.23 An estimated 100,000-
150,000 people died in rural and urban areas across the country during the Bosnian war, 
marking the deadliest European conflict since WWII.24 
In December of 1995, the United States helped to implement the signing of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of 











Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to officially end the war in BiH 
(although Bosnian Serb occupation of Sarajevo continued until February of 1996).25 
However, as stated by the former British ambassador to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Charles Crawford, “the Dayton accords stopped the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
without ending it.”26 While the Dayton Peace agreement successfully confirmed the 
existence of an independent Bosnian state, it also codified the existence of both the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, endorsing the division 
of BiH into separate ethnic entities.27  
Jelena Subotić notes that while the creators of the Dayton Accords have used the 
partition of BiH as an example of a successful constitutional model that ended the war, 
the Dayton Accords solidified the ethnic divisions that were at the core of the Bosnian 
war, creating a framework within which transitional justice mechanisms are not easily 
implemented.28 Moll explains that within this framework, each ethnic group’s 
nationalist ideals dominate the political space while competing with each other, 
resulting in very different, antagonistic, and politicized public memories and 
representations of history.29 
                                                 
25 Crawford, Charles, "The Balkan Chill: The Intrinsic Weakness of the Dayton Accords," Harvard 
International Review 21, no. 1 (1998): 84-83. Accessed February 18, 2021. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42762506, 82. 
26 Crawford, "The Balkan Chill: The Intrinsic Weakness of the Dayton Accords," 82. 
27 Bougarel et. al, 6. 
28 Jelena Subotić, Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2016), 164. 
29 Nicolas Moll, “Division and Denial and Nothing Else? Culture of History and Memory Politics in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Cultures of History Forum, December 4, 2015, pp. 1-13, 





Unlike any other European country, BiH contains the “parallel co-existence” of 
three ethnonational identities codified into law.30 Although the presence of ethnic 
division does not automatically lead to nationalism (or vice-versa), BiH’s political 
divides outlined by the Dayton accords were expressly driven by a linkage of ethnicity 
with a particular political identity, leading to ethno-nationalism. At the national level, 
three rotating presidents govern BiH, representing the major ethnic (and therefore 
religious) groups that often contradict each other in promoting their political agendas.31 
The Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia have separate prime ministers, 
while the Federation of Bosnia contains ten cantons, each with its own administrative 
government.32 Continuous ethnic tensions between Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and 
Bosniaks in BiH manifests into conflict over the realities of each ethnic group’s 
experience during the Bosnian war and challenges transitional justice and 
memorialization efforts in the region. Therefore, transitional justice and 
memorialization efforts in BiH stand as a form of resilience within themselves.  
 
                                                 
30 Moll, “Division and Denial and Nothing Else? Culture of History and Memory Politics in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” 3. 
31 Nardelli et. al, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: the World’s Most Complicated System of Government?” 
32 Nardelli, Alberto, Denis Dzidic, and Elvira Jukic, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: the World's Most 







Transitional Justice and Memorialization: Literature Review 
The past is gone, it is already de-termin(at)ed; it cannot be changed. The 
future, by contrast, is open, uncertain, indeterminate.  What can change 
about the past is its meaning, which is subject to reinterpretations 
anchored in intentions and expectations toward the future. . . Actors and 
activities 'use' the past, bringing their understandings and interpretations 
about it into the public sphere of debate. Their intention is to 
establish/convince/transmit their narrative, so that others will accept it.33  
             -Elizabeth Jelin 
Conceptualizing Transitional Justice 
Transitional justice is defined as mechanisms and processes that a society can 
implement to better acknowledge the legacy of large-scale human rights abuses to 
ensure accountability, deliver justice to victims, and achieve community 
reconciliation.34 Pablo De Greiff notes a 2004 UN Secretary General Report titled "The 
Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies” which 
highlights the importance of criminal justice, truth-telling, reparations, and 
memorialization as part of transitional justice mechanisms.35 De Greiff argues that 
although these measures would be most effective when executed holistically, no country 
can claim legitimate success in implementing all of these mechanisms to an equal 
degree.36  
Martha Minow argues that the desire for transitional justice mechanisms in post-
conflict societies relies on the assumption that traditional court procedures are 
                                                 
33 Elizabeth Jelin, Judy Rein, and Marcial Godoy-Anativia, State Repression and the Labors of Memory 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), 27 
34 Pablo De Greiff, “Theorizing Transitional Justice,” Transitional Justice 51 (2012): pp. 31-77, 
https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814794661.003.0002, 31. 
35 Ibid. 





inadequate to address all of the needs of citizens in the aftermath of regional trauma.37 
Amy Sodaro notes that the implementation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the UN Genocide Convention in 1948, and the subsequent Nuremberg trials in 
the aftermath of WWII set a precedent for international justice.38 However, the goal of 
traditional court procedures is to operate under the guise of formal justice, where 
closure is symbolized by a final verdict or a sentence.39 Yet, Minow argues that 
reconciliation is not a primary goal of the court system, as “reconstruction of a 
relationship, seeking to heal the accused, or indeed, healing the rest of the community,” 
are not the aim of formal justice mechanisms in any direct sense.40  
According to Paige Arthur, the central goal of international human rights 
movements until the 1980s was to shame governments into justly treating their citizens, 
without focusing on accountability for human rights violations.41 However, the end of 
oppressive Latin American regimes throughout the 1980s, most notably in Argentina, 
created a new space for human rights activists and organizations to question how to 
address past human rights issues in transitioning governments.42  
A report from the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) explains 
that the term transitional justice emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the wake 
                                                 
37 Martha Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass 
Violence. (Beacon Press, 1998), 26. 
38 Amy Sodaro, “Memorial Museums: The Emergence of a New Form,” in Exhibiting Atrocity: Memorial 
Museums and the Politics of Past Violence (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2018), 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1v2xskk.5, 18-19. 
39 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence, 26. 
40 Minow, 26.  
41 Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): pp. 321-367, https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0069, 328. 






of multiple instances of regional trauma when human rights activists wanted to address 
systematic abuses by former regimes without disrupting political transformations 
already underway.43 Although post-war reconciliation and transitional justice efforts 
may have taken shape as early as the creation of the Nuremberg trials, it wasn’t until the 
end of oppressive Latin American regimes that the terms and processes of transitional 
justice were regarded as a positive transitional effort tied to concepts of liberal 
democracy.44 Kris Brown notes that research of social memory and the process of 
memorialization has drastically increased with the introduction of the term transitional 
justice.45 Brown explains that this coincides with a global “memory boom,” as societies 
worldwide have assigned a higher social and political value in acknowledging the past 
and formulating collective memories.46 As many countries recovering from conflict 
were transitioning from dictatorship or state-sponsored terrorism to democracy, 
community and governmental response to systematic human rights abuses were coined 
as mechanisms of transitional justice.47  
Minow argues that the efficacy of transitional justice initiatives within a post-
conflict society depends on accountability from perpetrators of harm, in addition to 
victim willingness and participation in addressing past atrocities and their present-day 
consequences.48 Without accountability, De Greiff suggests that transitional justice is 
                                                 
43 “What Is Transitional Justice?” (International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009), 
https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf, 1. 
44 “What is Transitional Justice?”, 1. 
45 Kris Brown, “Commemoration as Symbolic Reparation: New Narratives or Spaces of Conflict?,” 
Human Rights Review 14, no. 3 (2013): pp. 273-289, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12142-013-0277-z, 275. 
46 Brown, “Commemoration as Symbolic Reparation: New Narratives or Spaces of Conflict?”, 275. 
47 “What is Transitional Justice?”, 1. 





somewhat performative rather than a catalyst for real systemic change.49 De Greiff 
emphasizes that there must be ‘bi-directional relations’ between different forms of 
transitional justice to significantly impact society.50 He writes, “just as reparations call 
for truth-telling if the benefits are to be interpreted as a justice measure, truth-telling 
seems to call for reparations if words are to be seen, in the end, as more than 
inconsequential chatter.”51  
Erik Meyer adds that transitional justice mechanisms are most effective when 
they occur during the lifetime of both the victims and perpetrators, a concept that he 
labels as ‘temporal proximity.’52 Meyer emphasizes the necessity of confronting the 
past for future political systems to function and highlights that it is in a country’s best 
interest to engage in transitional justice mechanisms to establish its standing within the 
international community.53 Essentially, acknowledging the past has little societal 
consequence if there are no further policy reforms or transitional justice initiatives that 
directly address the aftermath of the conflict, the victims, and the effects on the 
community. 
The failure of more formal institutional responses to adequately address war 
crimes has inspired alternative efforts of addressing the past, such as memorialization. 
Although memorialization has similar goals to other transitional justice efforts, it takes 
a unique form and seeks to fill the gaps left by other efforts. Focusing on history to 
process collective memory of a nation’s experience with trauma, aided through 
                                                 
49 De Greiff, 37. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Erik Meyer, “Memory and Politics,” in Cultural Memory Studies: An International and 
Interdisciplinary Handbook (New York, NY: De Gruyter, Inc., 2008), pp. 173-180, 173-174. 





transitional justice efforts such as memorialization, can assist ethnically divided 
societies like BiH in reconciliation efforts. However, not all memorialization efforts 
function to promote reconciliation. Implementing memorialization efforts in an 
ethnically divided society is difficult, as civilian and political actors that experienced 
the war have multiple narratives and different experiences of trauma. Complex “truths” 
of each ethnic group exist but are not necessarily in agreement with each other. Hassan 
Mneimneh states that memorialization efforts often blur the line between remembrance 
and actively promoting a political agenda.54  Mneimneh argues that “‘remembering is 
by necessity refashioning the past, through the selective highlight of elements of 
subjective relevance,’” indicating that memorialization efforts demonstrate a selective 
perspective of the group that helped to implement it.55 Regardless of the form and 
intended function, memorialization sites are often contested, especially in ethnically 
divided societies.56  
Forms and Functions of Memorialization 
 Documenting the past can be done in various ways, so the forms of 
memorialization are vast. In a report published by the U.S. Institute of Peace, Judy 
Barsalou and Victoria Baxter outline the main forms of memorialization, categorized 
through constructed sites, found sites, and activities.57  
                                                 
54 De Greiff, 37. 
55 De Greiff, 37. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Judy Barsalou and Victoria Baxter, “The Urge to Remember: The Role of Memorials in Social 








Constructed Sites • Museums and commemorative 
libraries  
• Monuments  
• Walls of names of victims  
• Virtual memorials on the World 
Wide Web  
Found Sites • Graves  
• Locations of mass killings or 
genocide  
• Former torture 
centers/concentration camps  
Activities • Anniversaries of coups, battles, or 
other actions related to the 
conflict  
• Temporary exhibits  
• Renaming or rededicating streets, 
buildings, or infrastructure  
• Walking tours or parades  
• Demonstrations and vigils  
• Public apologies  
 
Table 1: Forms of Memorialization.  
Source: Louis Bickford, International Center for Transitional Justice. 
This table demonstrates that memorialization tactics do not have a specific 
blueprint, and their forms vary depending on the context. These forms are not mutually 
exclusive, and larger memorialization efforts often include multiple memorialization 
tactics, including a combination of constructed sites, found sites, and activities.  
Roberta Villalón writes that in El Salvador, the Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen 
(Museum of the Word and the Image) archives documents, belongings, and oral history 





Salvadorian civil war.58 Along with this constructed site, the Museo de la Palabra y la 
Imagen has commemorative activities, leading educational programs and community 
engagement projects to promote memory preservation and identity building.59 Open to 
the public, the Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen is committed to a culture of peace but 
has a limited structural impact within El Salvador, as its government actively weakens 
liberal mobilizations.60 
While some forms of memorialization are more abstract (such as sculptures or 
art installations to commemorate victims), others utilize direct evidence of systematic 
human rights abuses to bring the past into the present. Rémi Korman describes an 
example of a ‘found site’ memorial in Nyamata, Rwanda, to honor victims of the 
Rwandan genocide (primarily of the Tutsi ethnic group).61 Inside the memorial 
museum, visitors can view the remains of victims alongside a description of the tools 
used during the genocide.62 Korman explains that showing the bones to demonstrate the 
treatment of victims is a “conscious museological decision” that aims to “highlight the 
meaning placed by the killers on the destruction of these bodies . .  By dismembering 
the corpses, by destroying them, they attacked their very humanity.”63 At the Nyamata 
memorial site, the display of skeletons serves as a stark reminder of the past and a 
warning for the future. 
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Memorialization takes many forms, implemented at constructed sites, found 
sites, and through activities that engage the affected community.64 To the extent that 
memorialization tactics vary in form, they vary in function. Barsalou and Baxter outline 
the primary functions of memorialization, listed below. 
 
 
Functions of Memorialization 
• Truth-telling or documenting specific human rights violations 
• Creating a specific place for the immediate family and/or the larger society to 
mourn victims 
• Offering symbolic reparations to honor the victims of violence and reinstate 
their reputations 
• Symbolizing a community’s or nation’s commitment to values such as 
democracy and human rights  
• Promoting reconciliation by recasting the national identity or repairing 
damaged relations among groups 
• Encouraging civic engagement and education programs to engage the wider 
community in a dialogue about the past and promote discussions of a peaceful 
future based on coexistence 
• Advancing educational purposes, including the retelling of history for future 
generations 
• Facilitating historic preservation of a specific era in a country’s or 
community’s history 
 
Table 2: Functions of Memorialization.  
Source: U.S. Institute of Peace.65 
The functions of memorialization presented by Barsalou and Baxter have 
positive connotations, and in an ideal world, all memorialization efforts would promote 
peace and dissuade future conflict. Without reflecting on the past, societies will not be 
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able to address the necessary systemic changes needed to promote a better future for its 
citizens.66 Sodaro writes that confronting the past through a method of remembrance 
contributes to our understanding of the promotion of human rights.67 Additionally, 
Brown suggests that symbolic reparations like memorialization can improve the chances 
of reconciliation through the simple acknowledgment of perpetrator harm and 
responsibility.68  
Although Barsalou and Baxter examine the functions of memorialization 
through the framework of transitional justice, not all memorialization efforts operate 
under this framework and are often hindered by political and social factors. For 
example, Villalón explains that the Dirección Nacional contra el Terrorism (National 
Directorate against Terrorism) museum in Lima, Peru welcomes viewers to the exhibit 
only under the guidance of a military officer, presenting Peruvian history through a 
militaristic lens.69 Villanón questions the museum’s form as a site that preserves solely 
the memory of soldiers, noting that denying certain groups the status of victimhood 
inherently questions different group’s legitimacy, negatively contributing to the field of 
memory, truth, and justice processes in Peru.70  
Although the two case studies of the Slana Banja memorial complex and the 
Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery in BiH that I will discuss embody most of 
the functions listed in the above table, they are implemented in a political realm that 
limits their effects in promoting reconciliation. While utilizing memory to promote 
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transitional justice is a utopic ideal, Sodaro argues that “the motives of memory are 
never pure.” 71 Sodaro describes that memory is often misused, distorted, or co-opted by 
political actors at the local, state, or international levels to promote reconciliation or 
further ingrain ethnic divisions.72  
Barsalou and Baxter note that “the past can be reinterpreted to address a wide 
range of political or social needs—recasting ‘subversives’ as martyrs or innocent 
victims, for instance, or consolidating a new national identity.”73 Barsalou and Baxter 
give the example of politicians building a new national identity by noting the stark 
transformation of South Africa as an apartheid state to being recognized as the 
“Rainbow Nation”, a coin termed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu in 1994 to encourage a 
national identity of unity rather than division.74 In contrast to this specific example from 
South Africa of promoting a new national identity, Barsalou and Baxter give an 
example from Cuba, where politicians constructed a memorial of young Cuban refugee 
Elian Gonzalez to push a political goal that the United States would return him to 
Cuba.75 This demonstrates that memorialization is not only about remembering the past, 
but also shaping the future, as politicians frequently use memorialization tactics to push 
specific political agendas. Similar to the examples above, memorialization efforts are 
highly contested as ingrained ethno-nationalist divisions formulate the country’s 
topography, political realm, and social structures. 
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Beyond the ICTY:  
A Need for Transitional Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
In 1993, the United Nations Security Council established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the Hague to hold top war 
criminals accountable for the war crimes committed during the Bosnian war and 
throughout the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s.76 The location of the court was chosen 
on foreign ground so that it could move forward despite local political opposition 
throughout the Balkans. Due to international political resources and will, the ICTY has 
successfully convicted over 160 individuals for partaking in war crimes in the former 
Yugoslavia.77 Ajla Škrbić writes that the ICTY has contributed various positive 
precedence to future ad hoc courts, such as the rule on “the obligation to distinguish 
between civilians and combatants” and “the rule to distinguish civilian from military 
facilities,” as well as being the first international court to recognize rape as a form of 
torture and a crime against humanity.78 Despite its successes, there is a lack of victim 
satisfaction regarding the work of the ICTY which helps explain why there is a need for 
further transitional justice mechanisms in the Balkans. 
This top-down, international approach is capable of achieving justice in a 
traditional sense through sentencing war criminals and encouraging victim participation 
in these trials, yet, the actions of the ICTY left many victims feeling unfulfilled by the 
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court’s actions.79 As stated by the first lead prosecutor for the International Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, “‘the success of the international tribunals will 
be tested by whether the trials were fair’” rather than the amount of convictions and 
persecutions by the court.80 The ICTY could only prosecute a small portion of those 
charged with violations, focusing on those most responsible for the most severe 
offenses.81 Minow explains that many Bosnian war criminals “elude arrest and 
prosecution by escaping, or dying, or concealing their identities, their conduct, or the 
evidence implicating them.”82 Others avoid arrest because their political party or ethnic 
group is in ruling power in parts of BiH, such as Bosnian Serbs in the Republika 
Srpska.83 Minow argues that as a result, the individuals who do face prosecution in a 
timely manner are unlikely to reflect the actual urgency to convict those most wanted 
for committing war crimes.84 
Therefore, one critique of the ICTY is that it is inherently politicized, despite 
being an institution that is supposed to rely on objectivity and function under the 
regulations of international norms.85 As the establishment of the ICTY occurred during 
the Bosnian war, many procedural elements of the tribunal occurred when war criminals 
still held positions of political power in BiH.86 Although tribunals should function as 
independent institutions separate from political pressure, Minow argues that the very 
construction and implementation of the tribunal during the ongoing war is inherently 
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political and is “understood as symbolic international efforts undertaken after no nation 
indicated a willingness to risk the loss of its own soldiers to stop the massacres.”87 
Minow references the minimal resources given to those suffering during the war, 
alongside the failure of the international community to generate a sufficient response to 
ethnic cleansing, torture, and genocide occurring parallel to the creation of the tribunal 
to demonstrate how critics of the ICTY believe the tribunal functioned more as a 
performative political response rather than an expression of the rule of law.88 
Although the ICTY embodies restorative functions by establishing facts, 
encouraging victim participation, and ensuring perpetrator accountability through 
prosecutions, it was not established to bring complete justice to victims or act as the 
primary tool for dealing with the past in the former Yugoslavia.89 Škrbić notes that 
when it comes to individual criminal responsibility, “the ICTY is authorized to 
prosecute crimes, but it has no opportunity to adjudicate the question of adequate 
compensation for victims of those crimes.”90 Therefore, other transitional justice 
mechanisms are necessary to help fill the gaps of justice left from traditional court 
procedures. 
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Memorialization Efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina  
In BiH, memorialization efforts have become a way for individuals, 
organizations, and communities to document important events or experiences of the 
Bosnian war. A significant organization in BiH dedicated to the research and 
documentation of memorials constructed after the Bosnian war is the Sarajevo-Belgrade 
Centre for Nonviolent Action. In 2016, the organization published “War of Memories: 
Places of suffering and remembrance of war in Bosnia-Herzegovina” to research 
“memorialization policies and cultures of remembrance in Bosnia and Herzegovina for 
all three warring sides, viewing it primarily in terms of the potential to bring lasting 
peace and reconciliation.”91 With a focus on ethnic models of memory, the publication 
investigates the national narratives present in BiH through analyzing various ethnically-
centered memorials.92 The Centre for Nonviolent action compiled data on 85 memorials 
in BiH, all of which were monuments relating to the 1992-1995 Bosnian war. The 
research highlighted the dedication of the memorials, either to civilian or military 
victims, and the location of the memorials compared to the surrounding ethnic 
demographic.93 
The Centre for Nonviolent Action determined that out of 85 studied monuments, 
53% honor Bosniaks, 25% are dedicated to Serbs, and 14% honor Croats.94 
Significantly, only 8% of monuments surveyed honored all ethnic groups, all of which 
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were located in places with a majority Bosniak population.95 This demonstrates that 
Bosniak-dominated spaces experienced a higher level of inter-ethnic tolerance through 
memorialization efforts.96 My case study of the Slana Banja memorial complex in Tuzla 
demonstrates this finding, as Tuzla is a majority Bosniak city with political elites that 
promote ideas of inter-ethnic tolerance and unity.  
The percentages of monuments erected for various ethnic groups somewhat 
reflect the percentage of war victims killed by ethnic group during the Bosnian war. The 
Research and Documentation Centre in Sarajevo reports that 64.64% of war victims 
were Bosniak, 26% of war victims were Serb, and 8% of war victims were Croat.97 
Bosniak victims are slightly underrepresented in memorials compared to the percentage 
of Bosniaks killed during the war. 98 In contrast, Serbs are adequately represented and 
Croats are slightly overrepresented in memorialization efforts, respectively.99 It is 
significant to note that 42% of surveyed memorials were dedicated to the memories of 
soldiers, 25% were to honor civilians, and 33% honored both.100 The Research and 
Documentation Centre in Sarajevo reported that 60.14% of Bosnian war victims were 
soldiers, whereas 39.86% were civilians, suggesting that the surveyed memorials 
adequately reflect the percentage of soldier and civilian victims.101 
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The Centre for Nonviolent Action found that most monuments are in “central 
places in the town/village,” “authentic sites (sites of atrocity, camps, sites where mass 
graves were discovered” and “cemeteries or the premises of places of worship.”102 This 
demonstrates that public accessibility to memorials is an important part of memorial 
design and construction, and is essential to their function.  
Political Limitations to Memorialization Efforts in BiH 
As ethnic divisions are ingrained within existing political institutions in BiH, 
implementing memorialization efforts rely heavily on which ethnic group is in power in 
the location of the memorial.103 Throughout most of BiH, local authorities are in charge 
of issuing construction permits for memorials.104 The Centre for Nonviolent Action 
documented that in locations with many members of one ethnic group with few 
members of another ethnic group, it is difficult for the ethnic minority members to 
implement memorials honoring the lives lost belonging to their particular ethnic 
group.105 The obstruction of various memorialization efforts by local authorities 
demonstrates BiH’s internal struggle of preserving distinct ethnic narratives while 
refusing to recognize others.  
Lea David describes prominent political actors and government officials aim to 
provide a “securitization of memory” to preserve their national identity in 
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memorialization processes.106 She writes that securitization of memory “refers to the 
need of a political elite governing a sovereign polity to have a secure identity by 
maintaining distinctiveness and routinizing their relationships with other groups.”107 
This securitization of memory by political elite leads to certain historical events being 
honored and remembered, while others are delegitimatized.108 In this way, securitization 
of memory “is generally used by the political elite to secure state’s own national 
identity.” 109 In BiH, each ethnic group implements memorialization efforts to secure 
their own identities and memorialize their distinct wartime experiences within the 
context of one country.110  
Dzana Brkanic notes that in the Federation of Bosnia, there are no laws that 
restrict the implementation of memorials. However, in the Republika Srpska, a 
memorial can be installed only if it is considered important to a local council.111 
Brkanic explains that any Bosniak living in Republika Srpska has to seek approval from 
the Serb council to implement any memorials centering Bosniak civilians of war.112 
Brkanic reports that over 90% of war memorials are implemented illegally, as many 
ethnic minorities living among a separate ethnic group construct memorials without 
permission from local authorities.113  
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Balkan Insight reports that this lack of implementational oversight further 
encourages the construction of memorials that promote division, rather than unification, 
between different ethnic groups.114 The Centre for Nonviolent Action documents this 
disparity by reporting that 69% of monuments in BiH are designated to the majority 
ethnic group residing around the monument. 115 In comparison, only 22% of the 
monuments are dedicated to a minority group separate from the ethnic majority in the 
area.116  
David adds that the existing ethno-nationalistic governmental structure 
established by the Dayton accords contributes to the divisive discourse around 
memorialization efforts and the fluidity of “truth” among different ethnic groups.117 
When approaching memorialization efforts through a nationalist ideology, memory 
defines boundaries across ethnic and geographic lines.118 Dženeta Karabegović 
recognizes that BiH has a “distinct memoryscape,” as it is a country that juggles three 
national narratives from Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs, and Bosniaks and their varied 
experiences during the war.119 Karabegović argues that the nuances among each distinct 
national narrative, and their respective truths and individual wartime successes or 
failures, hinders the potential for future positive interactions among Bosnian Croats, 
Bosnian Serbs, and Bosniaks in BiH.120 Furthermore, the stagnancy of political 
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institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina has created a context in which it is extremely 
difficult to accurately assess who is funding or building memorials, and if they reflect a 
truth about the conflict or instead function to deepen ethnic prejudice.121  
An Introduction to the Slana Banja Memorial Complex and Srebrenica-Potočari 
Memorial and Cemetery 
In the following sections, I will discuss the Slana Banja memorial complex in 
Tuzla and the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Complex in Potočari. I chose these two 
case studies because the sites were implemented in vastly different historical contexts, 
contrast in their design and functions, and offer room for reflection on the successes and 
limitations of memorialization efforts in different locations in BiH. 
The Slana Banja memorial complex in Tuzla, a city within the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, is an example of a constructed site memorial, originally 
utilized to share the history of the Socialist regime in Tuzla.122 After the Bosnian war, 
the site was repurposed following the construction of a civilian cemetery to victims of 
the Kapija massacre, and subsequent commemoration memorials for the Bosnian war 
were implemented in the complex.123 Local authorities in Tuzla were affiliated with 
non-nationalist parties before and during the Bosnian war, and carry that legacy of non-
nationalism through the construction and maintenance of the complex.124 Local Tuzlans 
                                                 
121 Sinisa Jakov Marusic et al., “Ethnic Divisions Set in Stone.” 
122 “Tuzla: a Changing Memorial Culture for a New Vision of Bosnia,” CRICResearchProject, March 12, 
2012, Youtube video, 10:47, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SAQAMgVBBiY. 
123 Ioannis Armakalos, “Imagining Community in Bosnia: Constructing and Reconstructing the Slana 
Banja Memorial Complex in Tuzla,” in War and Cultural Heritage: Biographies of Place (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 225-250, 237. 
124 Goran Filic, “Rejection of Radical Nationalism in Wartime Yugoslavia: The Case of Tuzla (1990–






consider the use of the complex as one of the most important wartime collaborations in 
the city. 125 However, ethno-nationalist politicians and civilians in BiH are unlikely to 
see it as such.126 
 In contrast, the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery in Potočari is an 
example of a memorialization effort that utilizes constructed sites, found sites, and 
activities to memorialize the Srebrenica genocide. The site commemorates the genocide 
of 8,000 Muslim men and boys killed by Bosnian Serb forces in July of 1995, and 
functions as a place of healing for survivors and family of victims. The local Bosniak 
community and the international community worked together to implement the complex 
within the Republika Srpska in response to the failure of UN Dutch Peacekeepers to 
protect Bosniaks from Bosnian Serb forces during the war.127 However, the site remains 
a place of contention for surrounding Bosnian Serbs, as it is a site dedicated solely to 
Bosniak victims within the Bosnian Serb dominated Republika Srpska.128 
 These two cases illustrate examples of memorialization efforts that are 
considered successful by some but a distortion of “truth” by others. Through studying 
these cases, I aim to examine the successes and limitations of these specific 
memorialization efforts in BiH while demonstrating their various forms and functions. 
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Case Study: The Slana Banja Memorial Complex in Tuzla 
History gives life, meaning and direction to contemporary resistance.129 
-Tony Samphier 
Tuzla’s History of Non-Nationalist Policies 
Located in northeast Bosnia, Tuzla is one of the largest cities in BiH and is 
considered a thriving industrial center that holds political importance as the 
administrative center of the Tuzla canton within the Federation of Bosnia.130 The city 
has a unique history of promoting ethnic tolerance and unity throughout the various 
regime changes in the former Yugoslavia, which translated into the city’s policies 
during the Bosnian war. As the only municipality in BiH that outwardly rejected 
nationalism within its wartime policies, Tuzla’s encouragement of ethnic unification 
was labeled paradoxical to the nationalist approach seen across the former Yugoslavia, 
like Srebrenica.131  
Tuzla’s non-nationalist present is shaped by its ethnically diverse past, as its 
thriving mining industry encouraged the immigration of working-class citizens from 
across the Austro-Hungarian empire.132 As a result, Tuzla has a history of religious and 
ethnic diversity, as religious minorities accounted for 36% of Tuzla’s population before  
WWI.133 In contrast to Srebrenica, Tuzla was a city that functioned on inter-ethnic 
cooperation rather than division. While conducting interviews with residents of Tuzla in 
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2015, Goran Filic noted that “most people knew how Tuzla’s tolerance was formed, 
citing phrases and themes such as ‘Austro-Hungary, ‘industrialisation’, ‘emigration of 
workers’ . . . and subsequently ‘blending’ with the local miners.”134 
After WWI Tuzla entered an economic depression, as many industrial workers 
suffered in the war.135 When industrial workers went on strike for better working 
conditions, leadership in Belgrade sent hundreds of Slovenian miners to support the 
industry, and ordered the imprisonment of all striking workers.136  In response, Tuzla 
residents opened their homes to Slovenian workers, inciting the 1920 Husin Revolt 
where over 7,000 multi-ethnic workers in Tuzla led a fully armed rebellion against the 
national army.137 This history of rebellion, socialism, and anti-fascist ideology 
continued during WWII, where Muslim civilians in Tuzla protected Serb and Jewish 
populations against the Croatian Ustaše, allies of the Nazi party.138 In 1943, after 
leading resistance to Nazi occupation, Tuzla was recognized as the largest free town in 
Europe.139  
After the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945, 
Tuzla witnessed a dramatic increase of industrialization and infrastructure, leading to 
further migration into the city reinforcing Tuzla’s multicultural identity.140 In the 1991 
census, Tuzla recorded the highest number of citizens who identified as Yugoslav, 
rather than by an ethno-nationalist moniker (e.g. Croat, Serb, or Bosniak), 
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demonstrating that Tuzla’s citizens felt unified as one entity rather than separated by 
nationalist ideologies present throughout most of the region.141 While rural populations 
in BiH tended to be pro-nationalist, Tuzla’s rural population was well integrated with 
the industrial sector. 142 This influenced traditional rural nationalist ideas of ethnic 
division to one of socialist values and ideals.143 
 In Filic’s 2015 interview with Tuzla’s former wartime Mayor Selim Bešlagić, 
Bešlagić notes that Tuzla’s citizens and local authorities fought for “‘human’ rights . . . 
not for national or ethnic rights, but for ‘human’ rights and that is if I may say, the 
precedence of the democracy in the world.”144 In the 1990 elections, Tuzla was one of 
two municipalities in BiH in which leftist non-nationalists won political power.145 
Bešlagić explains that in other majority Bosniak cities, “nationalist parties won because 
they started from the assumption that our ethnic people are in danger and we have to 
save them. We, however were saving human affairs [rights] and we succeeded in 
this.”146  The political leadership in Tuzla remained the same throughout the Bosnian 
war as in the direct post-war period when local authorities implemented memorials 
pertaining to the Bosnian war within the Slana Banja Memorial Complex.  
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Tuzla During the Bosnian War 
In 1990, the population of Tuzla was 44% Muslim, 16% Croat, 16% Serb,  with 
24% of citizens self-identifying as ‘other’[i.e. Yugoslav, Roma, Jewish, etc].147 
Additionally, between 25% to 40% of marriages in Tuzla were classified as inter-
ethnic.148 While Tuzla’s political elite advocated for inter-ethnic unity among the city’s 
residents, radical and ethnic nationalists in other Bosnian cities like Srebrenica 
promoted ethno-nationalist policies that discouraged ethnic integration.149 This strain 
between moderates and radicals only heightened as the war continued, but Tuzla’s 
officials maintained their moderate stance, opposing multiple proposals to divide BiH 
into ethno-nationalist states.150 . In 1992, Tuzla’s local newspaper Front Slobode 
reported that members of the civilian committee stated “‘We are convinced that we are 
united, and with trust in each other we can and we will get through this difficult trial for 
all people and nationalities that live in this town.’”151  
However, Tuzla’s political focus on ethnic unity made the city susceptible to 
radical attacks during the war.  
Although Tuzla’s government promoted inter-ethnic tolerance during the war, 
many Bosnian Serbs living in Tuzla felt a sense of insecurity; as Bosnian Serb 
paramilitaries attacked the city numerous times. 152 Tuzla’s Bosnian Serb population 
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feared that Bosniaks would not trust them.153 However, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
human rights in the former Yugoslavia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, stated that “‘Serbs and 
Croats in Tuzla were not subjected to harassment as levels comparable to other groups 
in Bosnia.’”154 Although some Serbs fled to more densely populated Serb cities in BiH, 
most Bosnian Serbs living in Tuzla during the time stayed and participated in protecting 
the city and its civilians against potential threats.155 Ultimately, Tuzla’s security 
measures focused on protecting all of its civilians, regardless of ethnicity.156 
Additionally, politicians relied on local news outlets and religious institutions to dispel 
ethnic and pro-nationalist propaganda to create an environment of tolerance.157 
During the Bosnian war, Tuzla became a center of migration for internally 
displaced refugees, as nearly 50,000 sought refuge in the city.158 As victims of inter-
ethnic violence, many refugees criticized the ethnic unity present in Tuzla.159 This 
concern was further ingrained when on May 25, 1995, nearly six months before the end 
of the war, Bosnian Serb paramilitaries fired artillery rounds into the pedestrian center 
of the city, killing seventy-one and wounding over two hundred civilians.160 The attack 
explicitly targeted young people, as civilians gathered in Kapija square to celebrate the 
former Yugoslavia’s Day of Youth to demonstrate the strength of future Yugoslav 
generations. In response to the attack, Tuzla’s local authorities planned a funeral to bury 
the victims at the existing Slana Banja memorial complex, beginning a new 
                                                 
153 Calori, 18. 
154 Ibid., 19.  
155 Ibid., 18. 
156 Ibid., 16. 
157 Ibid.  
158 Joshua N. Weiss, “Tuzla, The Third Side, and the Bosnian War,” n.d., pp. 1-25, 5. 
159 Weiss, “Tuzla, The Third Side, and the Bosnian War,” 5. 





memorialization process of the Bosnian war within the existing complex. In the post-
war period, local authorities expanded the Slana Banja memorial complex into a 
modern memorial space for community grieving and healing to commemorate the 
Kapija massacre and the Tuzlan civilians and soldiers lost during the Bosnian war.161  
Memorialization of the Bosnian War in the Existing Slana Banja Memorial Complex 
The Slana Banja memorial complex is located on Grandina hill, overlooking the 
city center of Tuzla.162 Meaning “salt spa”, the Slana Banja complex rests upon a 
former spa used during the Austro-Hungarian empire.163 Socialist leaders chose this 
location in 1959 as a memorial cemetery for partisan fighters in WWII, representing an 
example of a memorial in the form of a constructed site.164 The memorial park 
functioned as a recreational space where civilians could simultaneously learn about the 
history of Yugoslavia’s partisan struggle while escaping the pollution of the city’s 
factories.165 Iaonnis Armakolas explains that in the memorial complex, the 
commemoration of the partisan struggle and a space for physical activity “were all 
combined in the same space because they constituted values associated with and 
promoted by the Socialist regime” of hard work and physical strength.166 Over 50% of 
registered heritage objects in BiH relate to the history of the Socialist regime, a legacy 
of Yugoslav pride during Tito’s rule.167 
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Between 1959 and 1974, dozens of memorials and memorial objects pertaining 
to partisan soldiers and the legacies of the Socialist regime were constructed in the 
complex.168 Yet after this memorialization boom, the complex became overgrown and 
unkempt and primarily attracted people for recreational activity.169 However, the 
complex was revisited four days after the Kapija massacre, when local authorities 
planned a funeral at the Slana Banja memorial complex to honor the victims.170 The 
funeral was held at four o’clock in the morning due to the continued shelling of 
Tuzla.171  
In an effort to unite civilians in the height of tragedy, local authorities decided to 
defy the rules of official Islamic institutions and authority figures in BiH and buried all 
victims, regardless of religious orientation or ethnic background, in a common burial 
site within the existing Slana Banja memorial complex.172 Mustafa efendija Ćerić, the 
highest authority of the Islamic Community in BiH, opposed and criticized the “sinful” 
act of burying Muslims and non-Muslim victims of different religions in one 
gravesite.173 Additionally, nationalist politicians from across BiH objected to the 
“unification” of victims in the burial site and verbally attacked local authorities and 
families of victims.174 Despite protest to the joint burial site, local authorities remained 
faithful to their non-nationalist wartime policies and continued with the unified 
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cemetery.175 Unlike many burial sites in BiH commemorating victims of war, there are 
no religious symbols included within the gravesite.176 Instead, families had a choice to 
use non-religious symbols and engravings to honor their lost loved ones.177  
 
Figure 2: The completed memorial cemetery at the Slana Banja memorial complex.  
Source: Iaonnis Armakolas.178 
Continuing the legacy of anti-nationalism in light of tragedy, local authorities 
utilized the memorial cemetery as a site of community reconciliation and healing. Every 
year on May 25, the anniversary of the Kapija massacre, people gather in the town 
square and walk to the memorial cemetery to pay their respects to the victims.179 The 
local community considers the creation of the joint-burial site as the most important 
wartime collaboration in Tuzla.180  
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Following the joint-burial in the Slana Banja memorial complex, Mayor Selim 
Bešlagić and local authorities worked with the Tuzla Bureau for Urban Planning 
(TBUP) to reexamine the Socialist legacy of the complex and transform the Slana Banja 
memorial complex into a space of contemporary reflection.181 The TBUP noted that 
“Keeping the memories of the victims of aggression . . . fallen soldiers and civilian 
victims, is one of the most important obligations of citizens and authorities” and that the 
TBUP would serve this obligation by constructing new memorials dedicated to the 
Bosnian war while still preserving the old Socialist memorials within the Slana Banja 
memorial complex.182  
At the main entrance of the complex stands a memorial commemorating the 
units of the People's Liberation Army that fought in WWII to liberate Tuzla from fascist 
rule. To modernize the memorial, it was refurbished in red and white to soften the 
Socialist use of concrete, and the TBUP constructed a mosaic floor near the memorial 
that imitated traditional Bosnian carpets.183  
Apart from the civilian cemetery, two more memorials were constructed in the 
complex: the Memorial to the Fallen Defenders of Tuzla from the 1992-1995 war and 
the Memorial to the Fallen Decorated Soldiers of the 1992-1995 war.184 In 2001, Mayor 
Jasmin Imamović was elected to succeed Selim Bešlagić, and is the current Mayor of 
Tuzla.  
                                                 
181 Armakolas, 237. 
182 Armakolas, 238. 






While Mayor Bešlagić coordinated the initial resurgence of the Slana Banja 
memorial complex it expanded under the supervision of Mayor Imamović.185 Imamović 
notes that Tuzla was the first city in BiH to construct a monument honoring fallen 
soldiers and civilians and emphasizes the full participation of Tuzla’s political elite in 
supporting the commemoration process.186 
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Figure 3: The memorial commemorating the units of the People's Liberation Army that 
fought in WWII to liberate Tuzla.  
Source: Google Maps.  
 
 
Figure 4: The mosaic at the entrance of the complex inspired by traditional Bosnian 
carpets.  






Figure 5: The Memorial to the Fallen Defenders of Tuzla in the 1992-1995 Bosnian 
war.  
Source: Ioannis Armakolas.187 
From 2001 to 2011, the TBUP renovated and re-arranged preexisting socialist 
busts in the complex to form an “Avenue of Heroes” linking the older part of the 
memorial complex commemorating Yugoslavia’s socialist period to memorials 
commemorating the Bosnian war.188 By connecting the different stages of the memorial 
complex through a cohesive path, the spatial planning of the park by the TBUP 
reiterates that the memorial park acts as a space to honor the legacy of various 
generations and Bosnian traditions throughout history.189  
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Both former Tuzla Mayor Bešlagić, current Mayor Imamović and the TBUP 
wanted to promote the Slana Banja memorial complex as a space for recreation as it 
was during the Socialist period to expand its usage beyond solely a place for 
anniversaries or commemorations.190 By expanding the park’s pathways and maintained 
green spaces, the Slana Banja memorial complex attracts hundreds of Tuzla’s citizens 
daily.191 The mixed usage of the complex was seen as a reinforcement of political and 
commemorative functions while allowing the public to naturally interact with Tuzla’s 
history of the past and present.192 
Today, the Slana Banja memorial complex undergoes frequent renovations to 
preserve the cleanliness of the monuments and the functionality of the park as a 
recreational and commemorative space.193 Mayor Imamović frequently visits the 
complex and encourages the implementation of new memorials into the park.194 Mayor 
Imamović and the local community consider the Slana Banja memorial complex to be a 
successful memorialization effort to educate visitors about Tuzla’s Socialist legacy and 
the victims, civilians and soldiers alike, of the Bosnian war.195 
Successes and Limitations of the Slana Banja Memorial Complex 
The memorial complex represents an example of a constructed site. It fulfills 
Barsalou and Baxter’s list of functions in the way that it a) creates a specific place for 
the immediate family and/ or the larger society to mourn victims, b) offers symbolic 
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reparations to honor the victims of violence and reinstate their reputations, c) 
symbolizes Tuzla’s commitment to democracy and human rights, d) promotes 
reconciliation by recasting the national identity (emphasizes that all citizens are 
Bosnian, regardless of other ethnic affiliations), e) advances educational purposes, 
including the retelling of history for future generations, and f) facilitates historic 
preservation of specific era’s in Tuzla’s history.196 In equating the presence of these 
functions to a degree of success, the Slana Banja memorial complex is successful in 
carrying out these functions of memorialization as a tool of transitional justice. 
Because Tuzla’s was the only major city in BiH to elect non-nationalist political 
representation prior to the onset of the Bosnian war, it is understandable that local 
authorities prioritized ethnic and religious inclusivity in their memorialization efforts. 
Additionally, Tuzla’s government is the sole government in BiH that has never 
succumbed to political rule by the nationalist parties that emerged at the end of the 
Socialist regime.197Although local authorities received initial backlash from the Islamic 
community and radical nationalists when implementing the joint burial site, Tuzla’s 
officials persisted in maintaining the city’s legacy of non-nationalism in implementing 
memorials in the complex. The determinining success of the Slana Banja memorial 
complex as a memorialization site by local authorities and the community alike 
encompasses a continuation of non-nationalist wartime policies demonstrated 
throughout Tuzla during WWI, WWII, and the Bosnian war.  
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While the Slana Banja memorial complex reflects a heritage scape that promotes 
education and reconciliation for the civilians of Tuzla, the city’s boundaries symbolize 
the extent of the complex’s influence in encouraging non-nationalist policies in BiH.198 
The success of the Slana Banja memorial complex in fulfilling Barsalou and Baxter’s 
list of functions in collaboration with its inclusion of non-nationalist memorialization 
does not reflect the general trends of memorialization efforts in BiH, which tend to be 
ethnically and religiously exclusive.199 The viewpoint of local authorities and Tuzlan 
citizens that the Slana Banja memorial complex is a successful memorialization effort 
rings true for anti-nationalist Bosniaks.200 However, the complex is unlikely to be 
considered successful by conservative or ethno-nationalist Bosnians, because the 
complex stands as an example of inter-ethnic commemoration rather than division.201 
Therefore, the success of the Slana Banja memorial complex is limited to the 
environment that it exists in and the perceptions of local authorities and civilians in 
viewing the complex as a peace-building memorialization effort rather than one that 
promotes division. 
The Slana Banja memorial complex is a unique memorialization effort which 
expands beyond ethnic-nationalist centered memorialization present throughout most of 
BiH.202 The complex illustrates the usage of memorialization efforts by political elites 
to promote a political agenda of tolerance and unity for the future of Tuzla, embodying 
the goals of transitional justice to come to terms with large-scale past abuses to achieve 
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reconciliation.203 The implementation of the Slana Banja memorial complex in Tuzla 
greatly juxtaposes the subsequent case study of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial 
Cemetery in Potočari. While local authorities and civilians led memorialization efforts 
in the complex in Tuzla, local Bosniaks who lost loved ones during the Srebrenica 
genocide and the international community jointly implemented the Srebrenica-Potočari 
Memorial Cemetery. Additionally, while Tuzla’s political elite advocated for non-
nationalist policies that translated into the form of the Slana Banja memorial complex, 
the establishment of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Cemetery was in response to the 
ethnic genocide of Bosniaks within a UN safe zone in a territory controlled by Bosnian 
Serb forces. These two cases demonstrate the vast variations in the implementation and 
effects of memorialization efforts in BiH.  
                                                 





Case Study: The Srebrenica Memorial Complex 
As Serbian forces moved towards Srebrenica, it was, at times, hard to 
believe in the declarations of protection; they echoed in a chamber of 
“Never Again”, as the enclave fell. As survivors arrived to free territory 
by foot, by bus, by any means, the eyes of all were hollow with shock 
that was only multiplied upon learning that those they left behind would 
not be joining them, ever again.204 
        -Ron Haviv 
The Timeline of the Srebrenica Massacre, 1992-1995 
In July of 1995, Bosnian Serb forces infiltrated a United Nations designated 
“safe area” in Srebrenica and killed approximately 8,000 Muslim men over 
approximately ten days. Although the Srebrenica genocide occurred during a short 
amount of time, the build-up to the mass ethnic cleansing of Bosniaks lasted for years. 
Like Tuzla, the town of Srebrenica was established as a mining center in 1387 
when large silver and led deposits were discovered city’s hills.205 As a center of 
commerce and trade, Srebrenica attracted merchants and miners and prospered 
economically.206 After being seized by the Turks in 1440, the people living in 
Srebrenica were converted to Islam by the mid 16th century.207 Unlike Tuzla, the city of 
Srebrenica did not have a very diverse ethnic population. Throughout the 20th century, 
the town of Srebrenica was composed of a large Bosniak majority with a significant 
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Bosnian Serb minority.208 In the 1991 census, the Srebrenica municipality recorded over 
36,000 residents, with 75% identifying as Bosniak and 22% identifying as Serb.209 
Once the Bosnian war began, Bosnian Serb forces began to target as part of a 
broader effort to annex eastern BiH to join Serbia and Montenegro as a part of the 
existing Yugoslav federation.210 At the time, the city of Srebrenica fell under 
jurisdiction from the autonomous zone of Republika Srpska. Serb sources claim that 
beginning in 1992, many Bosnian Serb villages were attacked by nearby Bosniaks 
opposing the attempted annexation.211 However, Bosnian Serb forces continually 
shelled Bosniak communities in eastern BiH, forcing Bosniaks to move out of their 
homes and villages in order to control land in hopes of contributing to a ‘greater 
Serbia’.212 Because of the fighting between Bosniak military Army of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARBiH) and the Bosnian Serb military Army of Republika 
Srpska (VRS) throughout eastern Bosnia, many refugees fled to Srebrenica.213 Soon, the 
town of 9,000 inhabitants grew to upwards of 45,000.214 
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In response to the drastic increase of refugees and the threat of annexation to 
BiH’s eastern region, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 819 on April 6th, 
1993 to designate Srebrenica as a “safe area” under supervision of UN Dutch 
Peacekeepers.215 Hasan Hasanović, a survivor of the Srebrenica massacre, explains that 
the “safe area” surrounding Srebrenica was essentially a huge refugee camp, with 
inhabitants on the brink of starvation without resources to fulfill their basic needs.216  
Former UN ambassador Diego E. Arria, who introduced Resolution 819 to the 
security council expressed that he regrets this initiative. 217 It is now clear to him that 
the UN and the international community alike had no intent to defend the “safe area” 
against Bosnian Serb forces.218 When testifying at the ICTY during former Serbian 
President Slobodan Milosević’s trial, Arria stated that “The surrender of Srebrenica to 
the Serbs was of strategic importance—both for the Serbs and for the UN negotiators—
because Srebrenica had to be on the Serb side in order to be able to clinch a ‘deal.’”219 
With so many refugees concentrated in a designated area, Arria explains that the 
conditions of Srebrenica represented a form of “slow motion genocide.”220 This claims 
supported by the fact that in March 1995, Radovan Karadžic, then President of 
Republika Srpska, issued a directive instructing the VRS to “create an unbearable 
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situation of total insecurity with no hope of further survival or life for the inhabitants of 
Srebrenica.”221 
Former UN Dutch Peacekeepers in DutchBat III, the last group to arrive in 
Srebrenica in 1995, explain that their battalion was under-supplied and under-equipped, 
without a clear mandate from the UN about their tasks in Srebrenica.222 Serb forces 
already encircled Srebrenica by the time of their arrival, and the Peacekeepers were 
instructed to only use force in the case of self-defense.223 Medical and food supplies had 
to be smuggled into the area, as they would be seized by Bosnian-Serb forces if 
found.224 Former DutchBat III member Remko de Bruijne notes that for weeks before 
the genocide during his position on an observation post,  
We saw tanks coming our direction and buses filled with soldiers. Every 
day we had to report to [the UN base in] Sarajevo so I told them we 
could see ten buses full of soldiers on the road in Serbia coming this 
way. This was weeks before their advance and every time we made this 
report, we were told that the Serbs have been contacted and it’s just an 
exercise and not to worry.225 
Yet, the heavily armed VRS forces shelled and entered the enclave of Srebrenica on 
July 6th, 1995 resulting in 25,000-35,000 refugees fleeing to nearby Potočari to seek 
refuge at the UN basecamp.226 Survivor Hasanović said that refugees had faith in the 
UN to protect them, but on July 11th, Srebrenica fell to control of Bosnian Serb forces. 
On that day, Bosnian Serb general and Commander of VRS army Ratko Mladić gave a 
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speech stating “On the eve of yet another great Serb holiday, we give this town to the 
Serb people as a gift. Finally, after the rebellion against the Dahis, the time has come to 
take revenge on the Turks in this region.”227 Duijzings, a contributor to the Netherlands 
Institute for War Documentation, notes that Mladić saw the taking of Srebrenica as a 
revenge to the defeat suffered by the Serbs during the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and 
that BiH’s Muslim inhabitants were merely “purported descendants of the Turks.”228 
On July 11th, Mladić requested to meet with head Dutchbat commander Colonel 
Thom Karremans after Karremans requested air support from the UN. 229 Mladić 
demanded Karremans to stop using air support or he would immediately shell the 
refugees in Potočari. 230 The refugees were exposed to horrible conditions, cramped 
within an old battery factory with hardly any food, water, or medicine.231 During the 
meeting, Mladić requested that all weapons be surrendered to Bosnian Serb forces and 
stated that Bosnian Muslims could either survive or disappear.232 Additionally, Mladić 
requested that Muslim men from the ages of 17-65 be separated from the women and 
children for questioning by Bosnian Serb forces to determine whether they are war 
criminals. 233 In reality, Mladić planned to kill them.234 Mladić told Karremans that if he 
met his demands, he was willing to aid the refugees by transporting those who wished 
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to evacuate Srebrenica to the Bosnian territory surrounding Tuzla.235 Colonel 
Karremans agreed to Mladić’s demands. 
After recognizing the gravity of their situation, 15,000 male refugees at the UN 
basecamp planned to leave the Srebrenica enclave to start the 63-mile journey to the 
free territory of Tuzla.236 As the refugees assembled, the VRS began to fire, killing men 
while others scattered into the woods.237 Bosnian Serb forces traveled through the 
woods to kill Muslim refugees throughout the night and the following week, and only 
3,000 men survived to arrive in Tuzla five days later.238 
On July 12th, 1995 Mladić arrived in Potočari, as Bosnian Serb forces separated 
the men from the women and escorted the men into a large house for questioning.239 
Many UN Dutch Peacekeepers witnessed the mass killing of men and the raping of 
women by Bosnian Serb forces as busses began to arrive in Potočari.240 Over the next 
30 hours, 23,000 women and children were relocated from the UN basecamp to the 
border of Kladanj, where refugees had to walk six kilometers to reach safety, facing 
terror from Bosnian Serb forces along the way.241 The remaining men in Srebrenica and 
Potočari were rounded up and slaughtered by Bosnian Serb forces, resulting in the death 
of over 8,372 Bosnian Muslims scattered in mass graves across the enclave.242  
                                                 
235 Ibid. 
236 Francesca Cleverly, “The Death March,” Remembering Srebrenica, November 15, 2014, 
https://www.srebrenica.org.uk/what-happened/srebrenica-genocide/column/. 
237 Cleverly, “The Death March.” 
238 Ibid. 
239 Clevery, “What Happened in Srebrenica.” 
240 Srebrenica Genocide: No Room For Denial. 
241 “Case No. IT-95-18-R61.” 





On July 21st, Bosnian Serbs declared that UN Dutch Peacekeepers can leave 
Srebrenica.243 Before their departure, General Mladić handed Colonel Karremans a gift, 
and the two men shook hands and shared a drink.244 The Peacekeepers were seen 
celebrating and dancing in the streets, while the first reports of mass genocide begin to 
emerge as survivors of the Srebrenica massacre reached safety.245 
Initial Construction of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery 
 Despite the international community’s inability to protect Bosnian Muslims 
during the Srebrenica massacre, the international community has a large involvement in 
post-war commemoration and memorialization in Srebrenica.246 Duijzings writes that 
the ICTY in the Hague and the Office of the High Representative were the most 
important international forces shaping the memory of the Srebrenica massacre, while 
other international bodies like the European Parliament contributed to commemoration 
policies in BiH.247 
A crucial decision of the ICTY was classifying the Srebrenica massacre as a 
genocide and indicting then President of Republika Srpska Radovan Karadžić and 
Colonel Ratko Mladić on crimes of genocide.248 However, both men were only found 
guilty and sentenced in 2016 and 2017, respectfully, after they spent years in hiding.249 
Duijzings argues that for many Bosnian citizens, these delayed convictions (paired with 
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general Serbian denial that Srebrenica was not a genocide) hinder the efficacy of 
reconciliation efforts in Bosnian communities.250 Although the classification of the 
Srebrenica massacre as a genocide has broader implications for future war tribunals, the 
inability of the international community to protect Bosniaks to prevent the massacre in 
the first place has more important effects on Bosnian citizens. Political scientist Jelena 
Subotić writes that “International apathy included failure to acknowledge the 
seriousness of atrocities, lackluster interest in intervening to stop the killing, and even 
standing idly by and watching as thousands were taken to slaughter.”251 Therefore, it is 
understandable that Bosniaks do not always celebrate these efforts from the 
international community, especially when applied retroactively.  
The second international involvement that Duijzings notes is the creation of the 
Office of the High Representative. The Dayton Peace Agreement established the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR) to address memorialization resolutions and 
enforcement within the boundaries of BiH, as Annex 8 of the Dayton Peace Agreement 
provided for “the formation of a Commission to preserve national Monuments.”252 In 
1997, following resistance to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the 
international community awarded the OHR with the authority to “directly impose or 
nullify laws if deemed necessary as well as remove from office public officials if they 
violate the peace agreement.” 253 The OHR is tasked with implementing civilian aspects 
of the Dayton Agreement, including decisions directly related to memorialization and 
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identity building.254 In 2000, the third High Representative Wolfgang Petritsch issued a 
“‘Decision designating in perpetuity a plot of land at Potočari to be set aside as a 
cemetery and as a solemn place for the erection of a memorial to the victims of the 
Srebrenica Massacre’” as well as a decision to establish the Srebrenica-Potočari 
Memorial and Cemetery.255  
Additionally, the European Parliament adopted three resolutions on the 
Srebrenica genocide in 2005, 2009, and 2015 to outline the ‘proper’ way to 
commemorate Srebrenica.256 Each resolution “‘Calls on the Council and the 
Commission to commemorate appropriately the anniversary of the Srebrenica-Potočari 
act of genocide by supporting Parliament’s recognition of 11 July as the day of 
commemoration of the Srebrenica genocide all over the EU, and to call on all the 
countries of the Western Balkans to do the same.’”257 The following quote is an excerpt 
from the 2015 resolution, stating that the European Parliament  
1.  Commemorates and honours all the victims of the Srebrenica 
genocide and of all the atrocities during the wars in the former 
Yugoslavia; expresses its condolences to and solidarity with the families 
of the victims, many of whom are living without final confirmation of 
the fate of their relatives; 
2.  Condemns in the strongest possible terms the genocide in Srebrenica; 
solemnly declares that such horrendous crimes must never happen again 
and states that it will do everything in its power to prevent such acts from 
recurring; rejects any denial, relativisation or misinterpretation of the 
genocide; 
3.  Emphasises the need for political representatives in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to acknowledge the past in order to work successfully 
together towards a better future for all citizens of the country; highlights 
the important role which neighbouring countries, religious authorities, 
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civil society, art, culture, the media and educational systems can play in 
this difficult process258 
David argues that since all international resolutions are written from the position 
of a bystander, rather than the victims and perpetrators themselves, these policies 
enforce ‘securitization of memory’ for the sake of international actor’s moral outlook 
rather than for the benefit of Bosnian citizens.259 However, these mandates from the 
international community (in response to demands of Bosniak families who had lost 
family in the genocide) did result in large memorialization efforts to commemorate the 
Srebrenica genocide. Within the context of general Serbian denial of the massacre the 
location of the memorial within Republika Srpska, without international pressure, it is 
unlikely that similar memorialization efforts to the scale of the Srebrenica-Potočari 
Memorial and Cemetery would be implemented. 
It is essential to note that the decisions of the OHR were largely informed by the 
demands of survivors and family members in Srebrenica who lost loved ones during the 
genocide. In 1996, Srebrenica women formed an activist organization called the 
“Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa Enclaves” (now composed of more than 6,000 
members) representing the mothers residing in two of the UN safe zones established 
during the war.260 The Srebrenica women were inspired by the Mothers of the Plaza de 
Mayo in Argentina, a group established in 1977 by mothers protesting to raise 
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awareness of the number of missing children during the post-Peron military regime.261 
Acting as a catalyst for implementing of the cemetery and memorial, the Mothers of 
Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves contributed to the importance of the memorial site as “a 
place of maternal and familial suffering.”262 Janet Jacobs explains research on women 
survivors advocating for the establishment of the memorial in Potočari “found that this 
landscape held a particular meaning for the women because of the land’s connection to 
violence, loss, and death, ‘the place where everything happened and where nothing 
would ever be the same.’”263  
Serb Opposition to the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery 
 The Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery was established in Potočari on 
May of 2001, following the OHR’s decree in 2000 to designate land by the former UN 
basecamp to commemorate Srebrenica.264 However, prior to the construction of the 
complex, the mothers and wives of the murdered and missing men of the Srebrenica 
genocide began to organize commemorative protests in Tuzla on the 11th of every 
month.265 In 1996, the Mothers of the Srebrenica and Žepa Enclaves stated that they 
wished to bury their sons and husbands in Potočari, the location of where many had 
seen their family members for the last time.266 In April 2000, the former Bosniak 
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residents of Srebrenica utilized their representation on the municipal council to pass an 
ordinance to establish the cemetery in Potočari.267  
While Bosnian-Serb representatives initially rejected their proposal, they 
accepted in fear that their rejection would affect support for their political party.268 
However, the implementation of the memorial center and following commemoration for 
Bosnian Muslims were met with opposition. The first large-scale commemoration of the 
Srebrenica genocide took place on July 11 2000 on the five year anniversary of 
Srebrenica. Although now celebrated on the July 12, Serbs initially recognized July 11th 
as “liberation day,” as it represented the day that General Mladić entered Srebrenica and 
stated that the town of Srebrenica would be given to the Serb people as a gift.269  With 
over 3,000 people attending the commemoration of Srebrenica, the event incited attacks 
from Serbs against Bosniaks.270 One house containing the family of Muslim returnees 
who had fled Srebrenica was set on fire, while Serb spectators stoned a bus full of 
Bosniaks travelling to Srebrenica.271 Despite representatives from various Western and 
Islamic countries attending the commemoration, there were no representatives from the 
Republika Srpska present, as numerous Republika Srpska officials who have attended 
commemorations in Srebrenica have been labeled as traitors by Serb politicians.272  
A common request of Bosnian Serbs living in Srebrenica was to have the 
international community implement a memorial site to equally recognize the Serb 
victims lost during the Bosnian war. However, in 2001 when RS Justice Ministry 
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suggested that the names of Serb victims from the Srebrenica area be added to the list at 
the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery, members of Serb associations of war 
veterans and families adamantly rejected the suggestion.273 Instead, Bosnian-Serbs 
living near Srebrenica constructed their own monuments to honor lost Serb lives, like a 
monument unveiled in nearby Kravica in July of 2001, 6 years after the Srebrenica 
genocide.274 Although Republika Srpska officials did not attend the commemoration in 
Potočari the previous day, they attended the monuments unveiling to honor Serb victims 
in Kravica.275 
Duijzings notes that Serb reactions to Srebrenica commemorations as well as the 
Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery “have oscillated between outright 
obstruction and reluctant cooperation.”276 Unlike the implementation of the Slana Banja 
Memorial Complex in Tuzla, local authorities of different ethnicities did not work 
together in Srebrenica to implement memorialization efforts that appeal to their 
ethnically diverse population. Although Duijzings writes that the Republika Srpska 
government has been increasingly cooperative in allowing Muslim commemorations for 
Srebrenica, the government still promotes a false sense of the history of Srebrenica and 
the number of Serb victims killed, therefore dismissing the facts and history displayed 
within the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery.277  
In September of 2002, the Republika Srpska issued a report detailing the events 
of Srebrenica, claiming that only 100 Bosniaks were unlawfully killed, while an 
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additional 1,900 died from exhaustion or from combat.278 Yet in 2003, the 
internationally appointed Bosnian Human Rights Chamber commission investigated the 
claims of the Republika Srpska. The commission released a report in 2005 detailing the 
names of 19,473 civilians and soldiers involved in the Srebrenica genocide, 
demonstrating the vast preparation by Bosnian Serb forces leading up to the 
massacre.279  
Additionally, between 2008 and 2012, the RS governments granted nearly $1.1 
million US dollars to the “Srebrenica Historical Project,” a “non-governmental 
organization” dedicated to distorting the events of Srebrenica to inflate the number of 
Serb losses in Srebrenica.280 Peter Lippman writes that in 2009, the organization filed a 
lawsuit against the Dutch State and the United Nations for their failure to protect Serbs 
from attacks from the Muslim population in areas surrounding Srebrenica, imitating a 
lawsuit filed by the Mothers of Srebrenica to the same parties for failure to protect 
Bosniaks from genocide.281 Lippman writes that the Srebrenica Historical Project’s 
lawsuit “alleged that some thirty-five hundred Serbs were killed by raiding Muslims in 
the Srebrenica area.” 282 While this figure has circulated among Serb revisionists, “it is 
greatly distorted in the case of Srebrenica. It more accurately reflects the number of 
Serb casualties—both military and civilian—throughout the entire war in the broader 
Birač region.”283 Duijzing argues that the dominant post-war Serb narrative has been to 
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equate Serb aggression and Serb losses with those of Muslims and Croats alike, and 
designate themselves as victims as often as they are portrayed as aggressors.284 
The Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery 
Located in Potočari, the site of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery 
was chosen by survivors of the massacre, as well as family who had lost loved ones 
during the genocide.285 The cemetery was the first part of the memorial center to be 
constructed and was officially opened on September 20, 2003 by U.S. President Bill 
Clinton.286 At the time, the gravesite contained only 600 sets of remains, which has 
grown to 6,643 as of 2019.287 The graves are identical in form, with slim, white, and tall 
marble headstones, while newer graves lie under green temporary wooden markers with 
the person’s name and birth year, once identified.288 Each year, more bodies are 
excavated and buried in the cemetery on July 11th, the anniversary of the Srebrenica 
massacre. However, many bodies remain to be found, as Serb forces buried Bosniaks in 
mass graves hidden to conceal the depths of the atrocities around Srebrenica and 
Potočari. The northeastern section of the cemetery is full, while land remains to the 
south and the west to implement new gravesites.289 
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Figure 6: Mourners bury newly discovered remains on July 11th, 2020, the 25th 
anniversary of the Srebrenica Massacre. 
Source: Eurotopics.290 
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Figure 7: A headstone at the entrance of the Srebrenica-Potočari cemetery.  
Under the number 8,372, representing the number of victims of the Srebrenica 
genocide, the text translates to “number is not final.”291 
At the front of the cemetery is a memorial wall, inscribed with the list of all of 
the 8,372 victims of the genocide, including those whose remains have yet to be found 
or identified.292 Once entering the cemetery, a musilia signifies the central location for 
joint prayer before the burial of found remains.293 
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Figure 8: An overhead view of the Srebrenica-Potočari cemetery.  
The structure with the green roof is the musilia. Source: AP Photo, Kemal Softic. 
Located across the road from the cemetery is the memorial center within the 
former UN Dutch Peacekeeper headquarters. The implementation of the memorial 
center within this building demonstrates a repurposing of a found site into a place of 
commemoration. In 2007, former Dutchbat soldiers organized a visit to Srebrenica to 
meet with the Mothers of Srebrenica to discuss the Dutch contribution to the memorial 
center.294 The Dutch embassy in Sarajevo provided funding to establish a permanent 
exhibition in front of the former Dutchbat headquarters, titled “Srebrenica Genocide-
The Failure of the International Community”.295 The exhibit was completed in 2017, 
and the following principles guided its implementation: 
• Professional standards (of international quality); 
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• Preservation of the building's authenticity; 
• Inclusive approach, involving both the survivors of the genocide 
and the main users of the building in 1994/1995, Dutchbat's staff; 
• Using multiple narratives, where the formulation of a common 
story is not yet possible; 
• In addition to the importance of the product, also see the process 
(making the fair in collaboration with all stakeholders) as an 
important part; 
• The PMC [Potočari Memorial Centre] is primarily the place of 
the survivors. Where and how multiple stories can be processed 
is largely determined by them.296 
These principles demonstrate that the form of the exhibit was widely dependent on 
collaboration with the local community and international actors alike, focusing on the 
truth-telling function of memorialization. The exhibit displays the events leading up to 
the Srebrenica genocide and its aftermath, including video footage and photographs 
from the Srebrenica safe zone and UN basecamp in Potočari. Visitors can walk through 
the former basecamp and view the lodging and graffiti from former Dutchbat soldiers as 
it would have been in 1995, contrasted with footage from refugees fleeing into the 
basecamp for safety.297 In particular, the exhibition emphasizes the reaction of the 
international community to the genocide (categorized as a failure through the exhibit’s 
title) and the absent preventative measures by the UN and Dutchbat peacekeepers to 
protect the Bosniaks living in the safe zone of Srebrenica.298 
The back of the complex hosts the documentation center, established in 2014 
with help from the SENSE Transitional Justice Center located in Pula, Croatia.299 When 
entering the documentation center, visitors can sit in front of large TV that plays a film 









to educate visitors about the events and timeline of the Srebrenica massacre.300 The 
documentation center contains computers where archives of thousands of hours of 
testimonies from Srebrenica survivors, genocide perpetrators, and researchers that are 
accessible to all visitors.301 Additionally, the documentation center contains videos and 
crime scene photographs and military documents from Bosnian Serb forces and 
Dutchbat soldiers.302 
Finally, behind the former Dutchbat headquarters stands the former battery 
factory at the UN basecamp, where thousands of refugees sought protection from 
Bosnian Serb forces on the days leading up to the genocide. Today, the former factory 
exists as a large memorial space where visitors can view photographs and footage from 
the days leading up to the genocide and former possessions from Bosniak victims.303  
The displays house individual artifacts, such as diaries, wedding rings, and prayer beads 
either found upon discovering the victims’ bodies or donated by family members.304 
Along the left wall of the complex, there are several panels in Bosnian and English 
accompanying maps, charts, and photos detailing the Srebrenica genocide and 
information about the Bosnian Serb officials and their respective ICTY trials and 
convictions.305  
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At the front of the memorial room, there is a book of condolences where visitors 
can reflect on the events of Srebrenica and their experience at the Srebrenica-Potočari 
Memorial and Cemetery.306 
 
 
                                                 






Figure 9: The Memorial Room inside the former battery factory.  
Thousands of Bosniaks sought refuge here before Dutch soldiers handed them to 
Bosnian Serb forces. The poster on the upper left contains writing from Dutch Graffiti 
found in the UN complex, stating “No teeth…? A mustache…? Smells like shit…? 
Bosnian girl!” while the poster on the right depicts one of the Mothers of Srebrenica 






Successes and Limitations of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery 
The form of the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery as a mix of a 
constructed site, a found site, and accompanying educational activities fulfills the 
following functions of Barsalou and Baxter’s criteria: a) truth-telling or documenting 
specific human rights violations, b) offering symbolic reparations to honor the victims 
of violence and reinstate their reputations, c) symbolizing a community’s or nation’s 
commitment to values such as democracy and human rights, d) encouraging civic 
engagement and education programs to engage the wider community, and e) advancing 
educational purposes, including the retelling of history for future generations.308 
However, the memorial does not function to a) promote reconciliation by recasting the 
national identity or repairing damaged relations among groups, or specifically b) 
promote discussions of a peaceful future based on coexistence.309  
The collaboration of the local Bosniak community, such as the Mothers of 
Srebrenica and Zepa enclaves, contribute to the success of the memorial site in fulfilling 
the above functions. Ultimately, the memorial site would not have been constructed if 
the international community had successfully fulfilled the UN mandate to protect 
Bosniaks from Bosnian-Serb forces in the established safe zone. Duijzings illustrates 
the contradiction of the international community playing a large role in the occurrence 
of the genocide while also being a force that survivors and families of victims depend 
on for the large-scale commemoration of the massacre. 310 Through strong political and 
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financial support, the Office of the High Representative and other representations of the 
international community have transformed the Srebrenica commemorations, unlike 
other memorialization efforts in BiH, into acts of remembrance designed for 
international consumption.311 
Ultimately, for families of victims of the genocide, the most important part of 
the memorial site is the cemetery where they can have a proper burial for their loved 
ones alongside support from other survivors.312 In terms of providing a space for 
Bosniaks to heal, the memorialization effort is a success. Duijzings notes that for many 
survivors and local Bosniaks, the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery 
functions to reclaim space by bringing back bodies intended to be destroyed by 
Bosnian-Serb forces and establishing a Muslim presence within the complex within an 
area occupied by Bosnian-Serbs.313 Additionally, the Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa 
enclaves have utilized the commemoration of the massacre to demand economic and 
political support from the international community, and call for the prosecution of war 
criminals in the ICTY and domestic courts.314 
The limitation of the memorial site to promote reconciliation among ethnic 
groups or promote a peaceful future based on coexistence is greatly influenced by the 
location of the site within the Republika Srpska. Surrounded by a large Bosnian-Serb 
community, many of whom contest the memorials implementation and its delivery of 
history and facts that Bosnian-Serbs believe are distorted or dismissive to Bosnian-Serb 
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victims, it is difficult for the memorial to function to aid reconciliation in the region. 
Unlike the Slana Banja memorial complex in Tuzla which is generally well received by 
Tuzlan citizens, the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery is primarily accepted 
by Bosniaks and the international community, while contested by Bosnian-Serbs and 
primary Serb political actors. While the memorial provides the public with extensive 
archives, exhibitions, and places of mourning, current ethno-nationalist political 






The implementation and effects of memorialization efforts in post-war BiH 
reflect a wide variety of successes and limitations of utilizing memorialization as a tool 
of transitional justice.  
In answering my first research question, what forms of memorialization exist in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina? I found that all forms illustrated by Barsalou and Baxter are 
present in BiH.315 Through constructed sites, found sites, and activities, the forms of 
memorialization implemented in BiH reflect a wide range of processes. Specifically, the 
Slana Banja memorial complex includes monuments, walls of names of victims, and a 
cemetery, while also offering the space for commemoration demonstration activities for 
anniversaries of conflicts (such as the Kapija massacre) for the local community. The 
Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery includes a museum with important 
archives from the war, education resources for the public, walls of names and victims, 
graves and markers of locations of mass killings, and also stands as a fluid 
commemoration site for the anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre, where new bodies 
continue to be buried each year.  
While researching how do different forms of memorialization pursue or elicit 
different objectives? I found that the research on overall memorialization efforts in BiH 
suggested that memorials tend to pursue the objective of “truth telling” about the events 
of the Bosnian war, albeit presented from primarily one ethnic group’s perspective 
without recognition of the other.316 Yet, the objectives of each memorial are dependent 
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upon the historical, political, and social contexts of their implementation, which act as 
the driving force for their establishment and subsequent goals. My two case studies 
reflect how these factors affect the various objectives of memorialization. For example, 
the Slana Banja memorial complex rejects the dominant trend in BiH of 
memorialization efforts of honoring solely one ethnic group, and represents an example 
from the 8% of memorials researched by the Centre for Nonviolent action dedicated to 
multiple ethnic groups.317 The memorialization efforts of the Slana Banja memorial 
complex spearheaded by local authorities pursued the objective of non-nationalist 
commemoration of the Bosnian war, shaped significantly by Tuzla’s practice of non-
partisan policies throughout its history.  
In contrast, the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery pursued the 
objective of creating a commemoration site for genocide victims and their families, 
while also functioning as a way for the international community to take accountability 
for their lack of actions to stop the genocide. As Mothers of Srebrenica and Zepa 
enclaves, the Office of the High Representative, and Dutch representatives jointly 
imagined the memorialization effort, there are layers to the objectives of the memorial 
effort that reflect the individual goals of each actor. However, memorialization efforts 
have unintended consequences, such as continuous Serb opposition to the history 
presented at the Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery. Nonetheless, the 
contestation surrounding the memorialization effort further increases conversations 
about the history of Srebrenica and reveals the depth of ethno-nationalist structures 
within BiH.  
                                                 





In researching what factors limit memorialization processes in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina? I found that divisive ethno-nationalist political structures are the most 
prominent barrier to memorialization efforts. Not only are ethno-nationalist divisions 
codified at the national level of post-war BiH through the establishment of the Dayton 
Peace Agreements, but the dominant ethnic groups of each canton and municipality 
have significant control over the implementation of memorials. This was not a problem 
in establishing the Slana Banja memorial complex, as Tuzla’s local authorities all 
supported and contributed to the memorialization efforts. Yet, reiterating the points of 
Brkanic, in the Federation of Bosnia, there are no laws that restrict the implementation 
of memorials, contrasted with the Republika Srpska, where a memorial is installed only 
if it is considered important to a local council.318 Therefore, any Bosniak living in the 
Republika Srpska has to seek approval from the Serb council to implement any 
memorials centering Bosniak civilians of war.319 The Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial 
Complex was able to be implemented in the Republika Srpska because of the pressure 
from the international involvement, yet still faced continuous opposition from the 
residing Bosnian-Serbs in the area, limiting the memorial’s process as a transitional 
justice mechanism to promote reconciliation between Bosniaks and Bosnian-Serbs.   
Finally, in researching how are memorialization efforts evaluated as successful 
or unsuccessful? I found that the definitions of success vary between those who 
implemented the memorial and civilians and political actors who perceive the memorial. 
Additionally, although many memorialization efforts fulfill Barsalou and Baxter’s list 
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of functions, their subsequent effects do not always promote reconciliation or even a 
sense of understanding between ethnic groups. Local authorities and most citizens in 
Tuzla believe that the Slana Banja memorial complex is a successful memorialization 
effort because it fulfills Tuzla’s historical political agenda of promoting non-nationalist 
ideas. However, the complex is unlikely to be considered successful by conservative or 
ethno-nationalist Bosnians because the memorialization effort stands as an example of 
inter-ethnic commemoration rather than division.320 Therefore, the success of the Slana 
Banja memorial complex is limited to the environment that it exists in, and depending 
on who is perceiving it, it will elicit different responses. This same logic applies to the 
Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery, where Bosniaks consider it to be a 
successful memorialization effort, because it fulfills the function of providing a space of 
healing and commemoration for lost loved ones in the Srebrenica massacre.321 
However, many Bosnian Serbs and Serb political elites consider the memorial a 
distorted commemoration effort that ignores the suffering that Serbs also faced during 
the war.  
Therefore, memorialization efforts in BiH represent a form of transitional 
justice, but all memorials do not function to promote reconciliation. The act of utilizing 
memory as a reconciliation effort inherently suggests that the efforts will not be 
impartial to ethnic groups residing in BiH, as each group has a distinct memory of what 
they experienced during the war. “Truth” is fluid, and while a depiction of an event or 
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prominent figure in the Bosnian war could be considered accurate by some, it invites 
contestation from other groups that have endured alternate experiences. While 
memorialization efforts offer an important way for local communities, authorities, and 
the international community to document memory in the aftermath of regional trauma, 
these efforts must be paired with other transitional justice initiatives to provide holistic 
mechanisms to promote peacebuilding in the region.  
Thoughts for Further Research 
 If I were researching this topic, I would want to compare the implementation of 
other transitional justice mechanisms to memorialization efforts in BiH. I am curious if 
these efforts would undergo similar successes and limitations as memorialization and 
still face the same barriers to their implementation and subsequent effects. Additionally, 
as transitional justice and memorialization are newer fields of study, it would be 
interesting to refer back to my research in ten years and observe the changes within the 
academic field of transitional justice and memorialization. In response to the ongoing 
“memory boom,” more memorials will continue to be implemented in BiH, and it will 
be fascinating to see how implementation processes change as more transitional justice 
mechanisms emerge in the region.322 
 Ultimately, memory is a powerful tool that is shaped by local communities, 
political actors, and the international community to provide a space of healing and 
commemoration while simultaneously working to promote a political agenda. Memory 
continues to change and develop, as new generations contribute to the formulation of 
                                                 






identity. The politics of memory present in Bosnia and Herzegovina represent that 
history is never merely a figment of the past, yet, is an element that continues to shape 
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